The Political Hindrances in Solving the European Sovereign Debt Crisis by Fairbanks, C. Cole
Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the
European Union
Volume 2014 2014 Article 8
2014
The Political Hindrances in Solving the European
Sovereign Debt Crisis
C. Cole Fairbanks
Christopher Newport University
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu
Part of the International and Area Studies Commons, International Economics Commons,
International Relations Commons, Political Economy Commons, and the Regional Economics
Commons
This Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Claremont at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more
information, please contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.
Recommended Citation
Fairbanks, C. Cole (2015) "The Political Hindrances in Solving the European Sovereign Debt Crisis," Claremont-UC Undergraduate
Research Conference on the European Union: Vol. 2014, Article 8. DOI: 10.5642/urceu.201401.08
Available at: http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2014/iss1/8
Claremont–UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union 9 1
6
The Political Hindrances in Solving the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis
C. Cole Fairbanks
Christopher Newport University
Abstract
Once revered as a progressive supranational success story, the European Union now 
faces excessive public debt, unemployment, and stagnation partly due to its flawed institu-
tional design. This has become apparent in southern Eurozone countries like Portugal and 
Greece, which continue to suffer from strict austerity measures imposed by the International 
Monetary Fund, European Commission, and European Central Bank (Troika). This report 
examines the politics behind the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, including the rise of Eu-
rosceptic populist parties. Furthermore, it analyzes austerity in southern Europe, the ‘moral 
hazard’ argument, and the German government’s reluctance to lead Europe out the crisis. 
This report cautions against such a reluctance, which will allow populist parties to gain a 
stronger foothold in Europe’s political institutions and disrupt the European project. Due 
to the shift of the Eurozone’s financial crisis to a political one, it is in the best interest of the 
European Union and its leaders to continue to integrate its financial, banking, and political 
institutions in order to face the unique and dynamic political restraints in solving the Euro 
crisis. 
Keywords
European Sovereign Debt Crisis, Political Hindrances, Austerity, German Hegemony, 
Populist Parties
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The European sovereign debt crisis has hit Europe like a financial tsunami. Originat-
ing in the United States (US) through financial deregulation, risky bank investments and a 
colossal housing bubble, it did not take long for the US Subprime Mortgage Crisis in 2007 
to make its way across the Atlantic (Zestos & Rizova, 2012). Unlike the US however, the 
incomplete European Economic Monetary Union (EMU), which was unable to handle 
major financial shock, ultimately proved to be a ‘monetary cage’ for Eurozone countries 
(Razin & Rosefielde, 2012). Thus, the Eurozone has experienced a prolonged recession that 
recently has been partially curtailed by modest economic growth. Nonetheless, southern 
debtor countries like Spain, Greece, and Portugal continue to suffer from rising unemploy-
ment, austerity, and economic stagnation, which have ignited a political firestorm across 
Europe (Mackenzie, 2014; McMillian, 2014; Ivanovitch, 2013). 
To save the EMU and the single Euro currency, political leaders like Angela Merkel 
and François Hollande have called for ‘more Europe,’ hoping to lead the Eurozone towards 
full economic integration and prevent similar future crisis. However, both tasks could prove 
to be very difficult, as the Eurozone’s financial problems begin to present large scale political 
ones, both domestically and at the EU-level. This of course, has been exacerbated through 
the rise of Eurosceptic populist parties like France’s National Front. Along with other anti-
EU parties, the National Front now partially controls 25 % of the European Parliament 
(Adamson, 2014). Although division among these parties has yet to be resolved, this political 
shift towards the far-right could ultimately unravel any plan for a true political and eco-
nomic union in Europe. Preventing such a failure is imperative not only for the Eurozone, 
but the rest of the world. The EU is a symbol of universal democratic principles, economic 
cooperation, and peace. Moreover, the supranational entity is a model for states suffering 
from secularism, nationalism, and ethnic conflict.
Desperately searching for leadership, the EU has discovered that Germany is reluctant 
to assume a hegemonic role. However, time is running out for Germany and the EU, as 
Euroscepticism continues to grow stronger in the midst of fiscal austerity, unemployment, 
and stagnation. The Euro crisis has dragged on now for six years and has caused division, dis-
trust, and resentment as a consequence. Repealing strict austerity measures and mutualizing 
public debt must be reconsidered to contain the spread of populist parties from disrupting 
the European Project. Furthermore, it is in the best interest of the EU to further integrate 
in the midst of financial adversity in order to overcome the political hindrances in solving 
the Euro crisis.
This report will be divided into several sections: The first section will establish the 
theoretical basis of this report. It will give insight into the dysfunctional architecture of the 
EU, how the Eurocrisis came about, and why it has lasted so long. The second section will 
examine conflicting attitudes that the German people have towards the Eurocrisis to explain 
Germany’s reluctance to lead Europe out of the crisis. The third section will highlight the 
rise of Eurosceptic populist parties in response to the ongoing crisis and the shift from a 
financial crisis to a political one. The fourth section will offer some optimism to take away 
from the Eurocrisis as European leaders make reforms to combat unemployment and reces-
sion. Finally, the fifth section will reiterate sections one through four and offer suggestions 
to the EU for moving forward. 
The Situation in Europe
The financial disaster following the collapse of the US housing bubble in 2007 marked 
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the beginning of a domino effect that briefly toppled the European continent in 2009. De-
cades of radical liberalization of the US financial and banking system led to risky mortgage 
investments to unqualified clients, which ultimately added to the immensity of the US’s 
financial bubble. According to previous research from Zestos and Rizova (2012), “This 
was a major reversal of the financial and banking regulatory regime that had prevailed in 
the US after the Great Depression” (p. 70). When the housing bubble finally did burst, the 
US began to spiral out of control into deeper recession. It was not until 2009, that the US 
exited its recession largely in part to its central bank (Federal Reserve and Treasury), which 
became the fundamental tool in combating declining gross domestic product (GDP). The 
Eurozone on the other hand, has not been so fortunate. On the basis of a series of trea-
ties: Rome (1957-58), Schengen (1985), Maastricht (1992-93), Amsterdam (1997-99), Nice 
(2001-03), and Lisbon (2007-09), the EU has subjected itself to supranational macroeco-
nomic dysfunction. 
Why the Crisis has Lasted So Long
An Incomplete Economic Union 
Many experts acknowledge that the EMU represents an incomplete European eco-
nomic union, which has severely crippled both Eurozone countries, especially the periphery 
member states (O’Rourke & Taylor, 2013; Zestos & Rizova, 2012; Razin & Rosefielde, 
2012). Countries that joined the EMU and adopted the single euro currency relinquished 
their monetary and exchange rate policies to the EU, maintaining partial control over their 
national fiscal policies. This turned out to be a major flaw, as Eurozone countries quickly 
discovered they could no longer devalue their currencies to ease out of recession, leaving 
national governments fiscally paralyzed (Razin & Rosefielde, 2012; Zestos & Rizova, 2012). 
On the other hand, the EU was also placed at a disadvantage. Without a political, fiscal, 
or banking union such as is the case in the US, the EU was unable to fully assist Eurozone 
countries avoid recession through buying public debt via Eurobonds. The only exception 
came in the form of an announcement from Mario Draghi, the President of the European 
Central Bank (ECB), to do “whatever it takes” to save the euro. The ECB later announced 
it would buy all Eurozone members’ bonds, which is known as outright monetary transac-
tions (OMT). Although OMTs were never carried out due to legal disputes, they proved to 
be extremely beneficial in restoring market confidence and avoiding full blown depression 
within the Eurozone. However, OMTs also turned out not to be the ‘silver bullet’ that 
would bring the Eurocrisis to a swift end. 
The situation went from bad to considerably worse when the Greek Prime Minister 
George Papandreou announced to the EU Commission in 2009 that the previous adminis-
tration misrepresented to the EU Commission the Greek deficit. Instead of a deficit of 5.7 
% as reported, Papandreou stated is was closer to 12.7 %. As a consequence, Greece’s credit 
ratings plummeted, subsequently downgrading Greek government bonds. In addition to 
Greece’s government bonds downgrading to be worth virtually nothing, huge amounts of 
investment and capital left the country. Many southern European countries like Spain and 
Portugal would suffer similar fates at a lesser extent (Zestos & Rizova, 2012). For that rea-
son, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was asked to intervene by Chancellor Angela 
Merkel. The IMF, together with the EU Commission and the European Central Bank, 
known collectively as the ‘troika,’ rescued member states like Greece through relief pack-
ages consisting of bailout money. In exchange, periphery countries like Greece, Cyprus, 
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and Ireland were forced to adopt strict austerity measures to reduce public debt and deficits. 
Whether these measures have worked or will work in the future has been extensively de-
bated.
 
Austerity in the Southern Periphery 
The purpose of austerity measures is to produce long term economic growth and 
restore market confidence through cutting government spending according to the ‘troika’ 
and its supporters. These measures include: wage and pension cuts, downsizing of public 
sector employment, and privatization of public enterprises (Zestos & Rizova, 2012). Most 
southern Europeans would argue that long term fiscal discipline is necessary, but also that 
austerity measures have done more harm than good. The reasoning behind this logic is that 
cutting spending and borrowing reduces GDP growth and therefore, raises unemployment. 
Spain in particular has suffered from high levels of unemployment. According to Eurostat, 
unemployment levels reached 25.3 % in March, 2014 (Table 1). This number is even higher 
for Spanish youths between the ages of 16 and 24 who make up Spain’s generación cero or 
‘lost generation’ with an unemployment rate of 53.9 % during the same time (Table 2). This 
issue of austerity has become central to the Eurocrisis, especially in countries like Spain, 
where riots are escalating in places like Madrid. 
The Moral Hazard: A Northern Perspective 
Many Germans, including Angela Merkel, argue that encouraging southern countries 
to expect and rely on bailouts constitutes a dangerous ‘moral hazard’ that harms the German 
taxpayer as well as long term growth for the southern periphery. However, the level of hu-
man suffering that austerity has caused threatens to dissolve the EMU. If this happens, Ger-
many will have the most to lose, considering it benefits tremendously from interstate trade 
and the easy flow of capital through the Eurozone. Furthermore, it was the cheapness of the 
Euro currency that allowed Germany’s exporting sector to boom. With that being said, it 
is only logical that Germany will eventually have to confront its obsession with monetary 
stability and lead the Eurozone towards ‘more Europe’ to prosper economically in the long 
run. Nonetheless, the country which is ‘too small for the world, but too big for Europe’ has 
legitimate reasons for being reluctant to do so.
The Reluctant Hegemon
Germany dominates the European economy as well as its politics. Not only has it 
weathered the Eurocrisis, it has grown in strength. Unemployment is at 5.4 % (Table 1), 
the budget is balanced, and government debt is falling. It is also important to note that the 
decay of other powerful European neighbors has shifted more influence towards Berlin. 
At the beginning of the crisis, France and Germany were the dominant economic forces 
in the Eurozone. The close political relationship between Chancellor Angela Merkel and 
President Nicolas Sarkozy embodied the two economic powerhouses, which ultimately led 
to the creation of the word “Merkozy.” However, the Franco-German ‘Merkozy days’ of 
European economic domination are over. France faces stagnation and rising levels of un-
employment, which require major reform. Britain too, although outside the Eurozone, has 
become distracted over a domestic debate relating to its future role in the EU. Germany is 
almost all that remains of EU countries able to wield a strong influence in policy making at 
the EU level. However, Germany needs Europe’s support, which is why it is hesitant to lead 
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the Eurozone out of the crisis alone.
Many perceive Germany as demanding, especially southern Europe, which strongly 
associates Germany and Chancellor Angela Merkel with austerity. Others argue the con-
trary, such as Poland’s foreign minister, Radek Sikorski, who claims Germany is not leading 
enough. In a speech in Berlin, Sikorski said, “I fear German power less than I am beginning to 
fear German inactivity,” calling Germany Europe’s “indispensable nation” (The Economist, 2011). 
One thing is for certain, as Europe’s most influential member, Germany must take the lead 
in pushing towards full economic integration. After all, it is Germany that has the most 
to lose from a dissolution of the EMU, taking into account its aging workforce and large 
exporting sector. However, to ensure the Eurozone’s collective prosperity, the Eurozone 
debt will eventually have to be mutually shared, which may jeopardize German monetary 
stability. 
Risking such instability is widely unacceptable for Germans, who desperately desire 
fiscal responsibility. Historically, Germany has suffered from hyperinflation and economic 
catastrophe, resulting in two world wars and the destruction of the European continent. 
This still resonates with many Germans, who remember Hitler’s Third Reich and the Soviet 
occupation of East Germany. However, the current threat is not the sort of hyperinflation 
that led to the iconic ‘wheelbarrow of Deutschmarks for loaf of bread’ image of the 1930’s, 
rather, it is deflation. Nonetheless, the obsession with monetary stability directly conflicts 
with another German value, the belief in European integration, which is entrenched within 
the German psyche. After the war, Europe offered Germany a path towards redemption, 
reconciliation, and prosperity. This is embodied in the Germany’s constitution, which de-
scribes Germany as an “equal partner in a united Europe” (Beddoes, 2013). Thus, despite 
their concern over monetary stability, Germans are also eager to redeem themselves through 
European unity, which is politically apparent.
Germany is the most pro-European country in the Eurozone. Eurosceptic political 
parties have failed to reach the double digits such as the alternative für Deutschland (AfD). 
Over 60 % of Germans still support the euro, and therefore, Germany will be expected to 
act boldly to secure the single currency’s future. This has become clear through Angela 
Merkel’s push for more European fiscal integration. However, Germans’ conflicting attitude 
towards price stability and the moral hazard manifests itself through Merkel’s tough stance 
on fiscal prudence. Germany must let go of its fears of instability and act boldly to secure 
the future of the EMU in a united Europe. For reasons such as its reluctance to lead, fear 
of instability and desire for European integration, Germany continues to stall in resolving 
the crisis. As a consequence, Europe is starting to witness a shift from a financial crisis to a 
political one, domestically and at the EU level.
From a Financial Crisis to a Political One
Although the EU has experienced slight economic recovery, it still faces fierce criti-
cism from all sides of the geopolitical spectrum. In terms of ideology, the Right views the 
EU as a massive bureaucratic impediment to competitiveness and growth. The Left, on 
the other hand, sees the EU as a disguised fine-tuned neoliberal machine. In terms of ge-
ography, there is a clear division between northern creditor countries and southern debtor 
countries. The South’s position on ‘mutualizing’ or sharing the Eurozone debt directly 
conflicts with the North’s ‘moral hazard’ argument. Germany and Finland among others 
fear they will be forced to subsidize the irresponsible (Kundnani, 2014). Nonetheless, these 
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member-states may have to abandon strict austerity, or risk EMU being dismantled by 
populist political backlash. 
Domestic Backlash
At the national level, populist parties are gaining popularity almost everywhere in Eu-
rope, especially in countries suffering from high unemployment and stagnation. Far –right 
parties in particular, such Greece’s Golden Dawn and France’s National Front, have gradu-
ally gained a foothold in Europe. Furthermore, they openly support dismantling the EMU, 
which deeply concerns many Europeans (Ivanovitch, 2013). 
After significant gains in local elections, France’s National Front (NF) led by marine 
Le Pen, has sent a clear message to the French government, “distrust, distress, and disunion” 
(Alduy, 2014). The NF has capitalized on the French public’s frustration with poverty and 
corruption. Additionally, the far-right party has toned down its ideological extremism to 
appeal to more voters. Greece’s fascist Golden Dawn on the other hand, has done anything 
but tone down its radical ferment. Since ascending into the Greek parliament two years ago 
with 7 % of the vote, the neo-Nazi party has been labeled a criminal organization after a 
series of murders that are currently under investigation (Smith, 2014). The Golden Dawn 
is by far the most extreme Eurosceptic group in the EU. However, its rise along with other 
European populist parties highlights the dangers of a prolonged crisis, which thus far has di-
rectly linked with unemployment, economic stagnation, and austerity. These dangers have 
led to a major gain in seats for Eurosceptic parties following the European Parliamentary 
elections in May, which have the potential to block any proposal geared to further integrate 
Europe and resolve the crisis. 
More Danger at the EU-Level
Facilitating public debate on EU-level decisions and European integration did not pro-
duce a mass of pro-European citizens like EU elites had hoped. Rather, the financial crisis 
is causing a popular backlash in both debtor and creditor countries (Scicluna, 2012). The 
frustration over austerity has been taken advantage of by Eurosceptic populist parties such 
as the NF in the European elections. However, European leaders such as center-left Martin 
Schulz will also capitalize on Europeans’ frustrations, attacking austerity directly in order 
to combat the rise of populist parties. French Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault reinforced 
these sentiments, “You can see populist parties on the rise everywhere and if they succeed 
in the European elections, they will be able to block a reorientation of Europe” (Mackenzie, 
2014). Overall, most EU incumbents did not fare well in the EU elections. Therefore, all 
political parties will be hesitant to discuss hot topic issues such as fiscal measures and immi-
gration. Furthermore, most politicians will try to distance themselves from Brussels to win 
over popular appeal (Mackenzie, 2014). With the European Parliament partially under Eu-
rosceptic political control, mainstream EU politicians will have to work together to further 
integrate or diffuse, the former being the one most EU officials will support.
The Eurozone’s Long Road to Fiscal Unity
Despite political setbacks, there is still reason to be optimistic about the Eurocrisis. 
Although some argue that attempts to resolve the crisis through an unrelenting faith in 
‘more Europe’ in a political culture of total optimism will fail, there are signs that things are 
improving. The most tangible examples include the development of a European banking 
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union and the prospects for future treaty change that ill push the Eurozone towards a fiscal 
union.
European Banking Union has been the most concrete reform to emerge from 2011 
and 2012. It delegates more national power to the ECB, which will take over supervis-
ing Europe’s biggest banks. In addition, the banking union establishes a Single Resolution 
Mechanism fund to deal with future crisis (Barker, 2014). However, the banking union also 
has its flaws. Eurozone members will not share the burden of rescuing banks. Furthermore, 
the Single Resolution Mechanism fun is to be constructed over the next eight years, which 
many experts consider too long (Barber, 2014). Nonetheless, the newly created banking 
union will dispel concerns over hidden problems in the financial sector, give more teeth to 
the ECB, and most importantly, bolster market confidence (Barker, 2014).
Treaty Change is also on the horizon for the Eurozone. Negotiations are scheduled 
to commence at the end of June 2014 following the EU elections. Whether the EU moves 
closer towards a fiscal union and how much closer will be extensively debated. Debt mutu-
alization and fiscal discipline will be hot topics for leaders such as Angela Merkel, who envi-
sion a more centralized Eurozone. Her version, supported by Wolfgang Schäuble, Germa-
ny’s finance minister, will specifically establish a “budget commissioner empowered to use 
common funds and reject national fiscal plans if they don’t correspond to the rules” (Wagstyl 
& Barker, 2014). This highlights “Berlin’s determination for the EU to build on the Eu-
rozone’s fragile recovery from the financial crisis by creating institutions strong enough to 
withstand future turmoil” (Wagstyl & Barker, 2014). Despite this development, some still 
argue that attempts to resolve the crisis through an unrelenting faith in ‘more Europe’ in a 
political culture of total optimism,’ will fail for the same reasons the Constitutional Treaty 
failed -- any push to achieve fiscal integration will upset the balance of power drastically 
(Scicluna, 2012). However, The EU will have to gravitate eventually towards a banking, 
fiscal, and monetary union in order to prevent a perpetual financial ‘doom loop’ (O’Rourke 
& Taylor, 2013). ‘More Europe’ may not be the ultimate answer for the Eurozone, but 
in the case of the Eurocrisis, perhaps ‘just enough Europe’ will speed up bringing it to an 
end. Regardless, leading up to its sovereign debt crisis, the EU in the past was plagued with 
frequent economic confrontations which allowed it to grow stronger and move forward to-
wards further European Integration (De Wilde & Zürn, 2012). This round of treaty changes 
could ultimately prove to do the same.
Conclusion
The European Sovereign Debt Crisis continues to divide Europe and threatens to seri-
ously damage the economic and political integration that embodies the European Project. 
The Eurocrisis has dragged on for too long and has caused division, distrust, and resentment. 
Strict austerity measures and sharing the burden of debt must be reconsidered to prevent 
populist parties from disrupting the European Project. Through European leadership, the 
EU must stand together in the face of financial adversity to overcome the political hindranc-
es in solving the Euro crisis. There is a vast amount of competing political forces at work. In 
regards to the ideological spectrum, the Left and the Right are constantly pushing for their 
own ideological agendas. Geographically, there is a deepening divide between northern 
creditor countries such as Germany and Finland and southern debtor countries such as Spain 
and Greece over austerity and the ‘moral hazard.’ The former are unwilling to share the 
collective burden of debt as Europeans, instead clinging to their national countries of origin. 
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Meanwhile, the latter countries continue to suffer from austerity as unemployment, poverty, 
and human suffering rise. How exactly the Eurocrisis will continue to unfold is not clear. 
What is clear is that Germany will have a large role in the future of the Eurozone. Although 
the country is reluctant to do so, Germany must let go of its fear of instability and strive to 
bring the EU closer to economic and political integration as a way of thriving economi-
cally as well as redeeming itself for past transgressions of the previous century. However, 
Germany and the EU together must act swiftly to enact reform before populist parties gain 
enough influence to destroy the fabric of European Project. Preserving this project is not 
only in the interest of the EU, but also the world. The EU is not just a trade union, it is 
an idea. This idea represents universal democratic principles, economic cooperation, and 
peace, which are imperative to overcoming secularism, nationalism, and ethnic conflict. By 
analyzing the problems, arguments, as well as the failures and successes of the Euro crisis, we 
can pave the way for future supranational institutions to gain a solid foothold in the world 
and promote the universal ideas they stand for. 
Author’s Notes
I would like to offer my special thanks to Dr. George Zestos for his excellent guidance 
and encouragement throughout my study. I would also like to thank Dr. Tatiana Rizova 
for her appreciated advice and critiques. Correspondence concerning this article should 
be addressed to Chandler Fairbanks, 1000 University Place Box 4589, Christopher New-
port University, Newport News, Virginia 23606 Contact: chandler.fairbanks.12@cnu.edu 
Telephone: +1 757 784 0752
References
Adamson, P., Ruyt, J. D., Velzen, W. v., Noya, S., & Peets, L. (2014, May 28). European 
Parliament Elections Analysis. The National Law Review. Retrieved from http://www.
natlawreview.com/article/european-parliament-elections-analysis
Alduy, C. (2014). How the national front is systematically winning over the French elec-
torate. The Nation. Retrieved from http://www.thenation.com/article/179022/how-
national-front-systematically-winning-over-french-electorate#
Barber, L. (2014, March 23). A highly imperfect banking union. Financial Times. Retrieved 
from http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8a905794-b103-11e3-9f6f-00144feab7de.
html#axzz375CwUnfZ
Barker, A. (2014, March 20). How Eurozone banking union plan will work. Financial 
Times. Retrieved from http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/dd12cd7c-b035-11e3-b0d0-
00144feab7de.html#axzz375CwUnfZ
Beddoes, Z. (2013, June 15). Europe’s reluctant hegemon. The Economist Newspaper. Re-
trieved from http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21579140-germany-
now-dominant-country-europe-needs-rethink-way-it-sees-itself-and
De Wilde, P. and Zürn, M. (2012), Can the Politicization of European Integration be Re-
versed?. Journal of Common Market Studies, 50, 137-153.
Ivanovitch, M. (2013, September 29). Euro zone moving from economic to political crisis. 
CNBC. Retrieved from http://www.cnbc.com/id/101071178#.
Kundnani, H. (2014, March 28). Even Germany’s intellectual elite is falling out of love with 
the EU. EU Observer. Retrieved from http://euobserver.com/opinion/123673
Mackenzie, J. (2014, March 1). European center-left launches elections drive, attacks aus-
C. Cole Fairbanks Christopher Newport University
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2014/iss1/8
Claremont–UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union 9 9
terity. Reuters. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/01/us-europe-
socialists-idUSBREA200LF20140301
McMillian, S. Eurozone crisis turns into political crisis. The National business Review. (n.d.). 
Retrieved from http://www.nbr.co.nz/article/eurozone-crisis-turns-political-cri-
sis-117591
Mammone, A. (2013, November 16). The rise of the far right is overplayed- but austerity 
increases the threat. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/com-
mentisfree/2013/nov/16/europe-fascist-takeover-austerity-wilders-le-pen
O’Rourke, K., & Taylor A. (2013). Cross of Euros. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27(3), 
167-192.
Posener, A. (2014, February 27). David Cameron needs to take a leaf out of Angela Merkel’s 
EU book. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/
feb/27/david-cameron-take-leaf-angela-merkel-eu-book
Razin, A., & Rosefielde, S. (2012). What really ails the Eurozone?: Faulty supranational 
architecture. Contemporary Economics, 6(4), 10-18.
Scicluna, N. (2012). EU constitutionalism in flux: is the Eurozone crisis precipitating cen-
tralization or diffusion? European Law Journal, 18(4), 489-503.
Smith, H. (2014, March 22). Golden dawn: courage of two women stems the rise of Greece’s 
neo-Nazis. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/
mar/23/golden-dawn-women-greece-neo-nazis
The Economist. (2013, November 30). Die grosse stagnation. The Economist Newspaper. 
Retrieved from http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21590903-germanys-pro-
posed-new-government-set-turn-motor-europe-slowcoach-die-grosse
The Economist. (2011, November 29). “Sikorski: German inaction scarier than Germans in 
action.” The Economist Newspaper. Retrieved from http://www.economist.com/blogs/
easternapproaches/2011/11/polands-appeal-germany
The Economist. (2014). The secret of king horst’s success. (2014, March 15). The Econo-
mist Newspaper. Retrieved from http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21599066-
bavarian-premier-makes-most-his-regional-partys-national-role-secret-king-horsts
Wagstyl, S., & Barker, A. (2014, March 27). Germany pushes Eurozone fusion. Financial 
Times. Retrieved from http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5127f484-b5d2-11e3-b40e-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz375CwUnfZ
Waterfield, B. (2013, December 18). Angela Merkel pushes for EU treaty change. The Tele-
graph. Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/
angela-merkel/10526329/Angela-Merkel-backs-EU-treaty-change.html
Zestos, G., & Rizova, T. (2012). The state of the union(s): The eurozone crisis, compara-
tive regional integration and the EU model. Florida European Union Center/Jean Monnet 
Chair. 69-83. Miami, Florida.
Zestos, G., & Williamson, M. (2012). German rigidity: An obstacle to the resolution of the 
European crisis. Journal of Regional Socio-Economic Issues, 2(3), 5-19.
The Political Hindrances in Solving the European Sovereign Debt C
1 0 0 
Appendix
Table 1
C. Cole Fairbanks Christopher Newport University
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2014/iss1/8
Claremont–UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union 1 0 1
Table 2
The Political Hindrances in Solving the European Sovereign Debt C
1 0 2 
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2014/iss1/8
